The Science and Religion in Islam research group is the result of a collaboration between a number of Muslim academics who have decided to work together to explore the interface between science and religion from the perspective of different disciplinary horizons. We hope to contribute to the emergence of a working culture which is based on a double perspective: on one hand that of a rationality that is open to problems of a metaphysical, spiritual or theological order and, on the other hand, that of a spiritual life, of a religious conscience, and an inner experience that is open to philosophical problems that arise from investigations in the area of contemporary science. We advocate this double perspective in the sense that we consider that science and religion have things to say to one another. But, at the same time, this requires a great deal of clarity in our intentions as well as rigour in our method. The bringing together in a illusory side-by-side, or a fallacious analogy, of Islamic religious knowledge and the findings of contemporary science can lead to disappointing results since, by ignoring the specificities of the two areas and the singularity of the principles which govern their respective movements, this approach prevents, in reality, the emergence of a real "convergence" between science and religion. For this reason, unlike a certain reading which dominates in the Islamic World, we do not think that these two spheres of knowledge can seriously enter into dialogue with each other in a direct fashion. In our opinion, the nature of the relationship between the two areas requires an "internal", philosophical, theological or spiritual inquiry. Hence we will be able to phrase the question as follows: what is it within science that can enter into a meaningful dialogue with Islam? And what is it within Islam that can enter into a meaningful dialogue with science?   When we speak of Islam we are not only talking about the religious component. In order to promote the emergence of a serious dialogue between science and religion in the perspective of religion, we need to consider all the dimensions of the culture that has arisen from the civilisation that has been nurtured by this religion. It is one of the reasons why our research group includes not only mathematicians, physicists, and astrophysicists but also theologians, historians and philosophers. An interdisciplinary approach is an important aspect of our work: creating links between the findings of each discipline while keeping within the rules of each discipline.   The science-islam site intends to function as a knowledge forum in view of the emergence of a genuine scientific modernity that is rooted in the conscience of intellectual, spiritual and ethical values. Under these four section-headings (articles, abstracts, bibliographical references and links) our site will propose a certain number of tools, concepts and methods, theses and structures which may, in some way, contribute to the renewal or, more accurately, the "revitalisation", of Islamic thought based on a profound comprehension of the challenges and the advancements that are being made in the 21st century. 

One can summarize the philosophical presuppositions of classical physics in the following way:

  There is a physical reality independent of us. This reality is understandable, and the aim of physics is to understand this reality as it is.
  This reality is decomposable into recognizable components and each component can be described in terms of some definite properties such as mass, electric charge, etc.
  Macro-objects consist of micro-objects, and one can describe the behavior of macro-objects in terms of the behavior of micro-objects.
  The time evolution of every system is such that every state of the object is causally determined by its earlier state.
  Our knowledge of the behavior of physical objects is obtained through observation and experimentation, and the effect of the observation process on the observed system is negligible and is, in any case, calculable. In short, classical physics believed in an objective reality independent of us, and in our ability to get a true picture of this reality.

Important Ingredients of the Copenhagen Interpretation

1- Neglect of Ontological Problems

The founders of the Copenhagen interpretation, specifically Bohr, were concerned with the epistemological problems of microphysics and avoided ontological considerations as much as they could. They were only concerned about phenomena, and interpreted them in terms of classical concepts. This outlook was a result of the prevalence of positivism and instrumentalism. This instrumentalistic view is not a new idea, but in our time, it was developed as a result of two factors:

  The presence of difficulties in the interpretation of quantum mechanics

  The spectacular success of quantum mechanics in accounting for a large number of phenomena.

2- Denial of visualisability of micro-phenomena

The founders of quantum mechanics denied the visualisability of atomic phenomena. In their view, atomic structure is neither describable items of sensible qualities, nor conceivable in terms of space, time and causality. They can only be described by mathematics. It is the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics that gives a consistent picture of all observable phenomena and provides prescriptions for the relevant probabilities.

3- Dominance of positivistic thinking among physicists

The Dominance of positivism in physics circles of our era is mainly due to the hegemony of Copenhagen school. According to positivists:

(i) In constructing physical theories, one has to use only observable quantities.

(ii) The formulation of a theory should be such that it can predict unambiguous results. Thus, positivists avoided metaphysical concepts like reality, because they considered these concepts undefinable and non-empirical.

4- Refutation of Determinism

Classical physicists believed in determinism, i.e., the predictability of the future of an isolated system from its present state. Probability was used in some cases like the kinetic theory of gases. But, the general belief was that the state of gas particles can be precisely determined from the laws of motion. But, quantum mechanics denied determinism. Here, one cannot predict the exact future of a system. The only thing available is the probability of getting a definite result if the experiment is done for an ensemble of similarly prepared systems. The state of an individual system is not generally predictable. The most obvious way that quantum mechanics refutes determinism is through Heisenberg’s principle of indeterminancy which denies a simultaneous knowledge of the position and velocity of a particle. If we are to know the future of a system, we should know the position and velocity of its constituent parts - something that Heisenberg’s principle denies.Since then, physicists have generally refuted the validity of causality in the atomic world, and take this indeterminancy as meaning the ruling of chance in this domain.

5- The Prevalence of Idealism

Classical physicists believed in a world independent of human observers, and considered the duty of physics to explain this world. This is called naive realism. Idealism, on the other hand, holds that priority is that of consciousness, and it is the latter that determines the former. The dilemma encountered by the physicists of the first quarters of the twentieth century was that they could not give a coherent picture of microphysics. This changed physicists’ attitude towards the nature of quantum objects. The standard interpretation of quantum mechanics replaced the realism of classical physical by an outlook which had anti-realist flavour. Copengagen interpretation preached the idea that we should not be after the explanation of objects and events. Rather, we should be content to theories which are empirically adequate. Some quantum physicists believed that it is not possible to give a picture of the world in terms of material objects. Our world is conceivable only in terms of mathematics. The fundamental entities of the world are mathematical objects. H. Stapp has the same view:

“There is, in fact, in the quantum universe no natural place for the matter. This conclusion, curiously, is the exact reverse of the circumstance that in the classical physical universe there was no natural place for mind.”1

6- Quantum Logic

Some of the followers of Copenhagen interpretation tried to solve the interpretational problems of quantum mechanics by appealing to a new kind of logic, called quantum logic. They say the world follows a non-human logic, and, therefore, we should modify our regular logic in order to be able to resolve our quantum dilemmas.

Critique of the Copenhagen Interpretation

(A) Significance of Ontological Considerations

It is said that making predictions is not the sole task of physics, though it is necessary for checking the validity of theories. The main purpose of theorizing in physics is to comprehend the physical world as deeply as possible. De’ Espagnat puts the matter elegantly:

“As for the high-energy physicists … whereas their activity appears as essential as long as we believe in the independent existence of fundamental laws that we can still hope to know better, it loses practically its work motivation as soon as we believe that the sole objective of these scientists is to make their impressions mutually consistent. These impressions are not of the kind that occur in our daily life. They are extremely special, they are produced at great costs, and it is doubtful that the mere pleasure their harmony gives to a selected happy few is worth large public expenditures.” 2 and in the words of E. Witten:

“The purpose of being a physicist isn’t just to learn how to calculate things, it’s to understand the principles by which the world works.”3

If modern physics limits our knowledge of nature, or makes it non-transparent, this does not mean the actual reality has the same limitations. It is more logical to believe that our present concepts cannot give a complete description of phenomena than attributing the limitations to the world itself.

(B) Visualisability of micro-phenomena

Quantum physicists denied that quantum objects could be pictured in terms of space-time realities. In their view, they can only be explained by mathematics. But can one conclude, on the basis of the failure of physicists to give a spatio-temporal picture of atomic events, that, in fact, this is for ever beyond our reach?

E. Squires sums up the matter nicely: “These [i.e. quantum] phenomena may be telling us that radically new ways of picturing reality are required. In one sense this was the message, the positive message, of the ’ Copenhagen` interpretation: classical ways of thinking are no longer adequate, we need new ways of describing reality. The fact that it proved difficult to find such ways led to the negative aspect, namely that the quest was futile. This I do not believe.”4

(B) Limitation to Observable Quantities

Could particle physics progress if physicists had taken the idea of observability seriously? Do concepts related to unobserved entities like quarks have no physical content? Are they merely bridges between our observations? The idea of confining to observables was rejected even by some of the proponents of the Copenhagen interpretation. As Feynman put it:

“It is always good to know which ideas cannot be checked directly, but is not necessary to resume them all. It is not true that we can pursue science completely by using only those concepts which are directly subject to experiment.”5

(D) Denial of Determinism

The distinction between causality and predictability is often obscured in the physics literature. What the indeterminancy principle of Heisenberg implied was, at most, the denial of exact predictability. But, some physicists jumped from an epistemological position, referring to our ignorance, to an ontological position, implying the refutation of the principle of causality. This jump is based on the philosophical assertion that what cannot be measured does not exist. There are two important points to be made here:

(i) There is no justification for this jump.

(ii) The denial of causality is not the only avenue for the explanation of observations in the atomic realm. In fact, there are causal versions of quantum formalism, e.g. Bohmian mechanics, which account for the experimental results equally well. Dirac, who had accepted the rejection of determinism in 1920’s, changed his mind in 1970’s and talked of the possibility of return to determinism. We believe that it is not logical to dispense so easily with the causal explanation of microphenomena. Rather, it is more logical to attribute the appearance of chance as a sign of our incomplete knowledge.

(E) Idealistic Language

In criticizing idealistic attitude in regard to atomic events, the opponents say: there is a unique reality which exists independent of our thought, but can be grasped by our thought. Without considering this objective reality, science is simply reduced to some prescriptions for predicting the outcomes of the experiments. In Einstein’s words:

“The belief in an external world independent of the perceiving subject is the basis of all natural sciences”6 Those physicists who dismiss the realistic attitude do not necessarily deny the existence of the external world. Rather they reject any statement about the objective reality which does not refer directly to sense experience. This renunciation, however, reduces scientific enterprise to a set of prescriptions for making observational predictions and leaves the world incomprehensible. Even Heisenberg believed that the assumption of realism is necessary at the practical level:

“The physicist must, however, postulate in his science that he is studying a world which he himself has not made, and which would be present, essentially unchanged, if he were not there.”7

Questions

(i) Is the agreement with observations a sufficient condition for the validity of a theory?

(ii) Are we supported to leave the belief in physical reality simply because some of the present problems are not solved yet?

(iii) Can one deny the possibility of a future spatio-temporal description of microphysics?

(iv) Is not the belief in an objective reality the most important motivation for doing scientific research?

(v) Does un-predictability imply indeterminancy in nature? Is it logical to consider an uncertainty in our knowledge as an indication of indeterminacy and the rule of chance in nature?

(vi) If our present knowledge of physics limits our knowledge of nature, does it mean that the physical reality itself is limited and blurred.

(vii) Shouldn’t the developments of physics in the last few centuries prevent us from claiming that physics has reached the end of its development?

(viii) Was quantum physicists’ rejection of causality due to physical arguments or due to their philosophical inclinations?

(ix) If current physics cannot answer some fundamental questions of human concern, are we supposed to consider them meaningless?

Some physicists of undisputable reputation have expressed concern about the present physical theory, and many people have started to ask questions which were forbidden at the practical level. F. Selleri, G. Tarozzi and Alwyn vander Merwe have summed up the matter nicely:

“There is an increasing awareness that the founding fathers of quantum mechanics have left behind a theory which, though spectacularly successful in its applications, severly limits our intuitive understanding of the microworld, and that their reasons for doing so were at least partly arbitrary and open to questions.”8

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1. H. P. Stapp, in Niels Bohr and Contemporary Philosophy, ed. by J. Faye and H. J. Folse (Dordresht: Kluwer Academic Pub., 1994), P. 743.

2-. B. d’Espagnat, Conceptual Foundations of Quantum Mechanics (New York, Addison Wesley, 1989), P. 282.

3 . E. Witten, in Superstrings: A Theory of Everything, P. C. W. Davies and J. Brown (eds.), (Cambridge University Press, 1988), P. 98.

4. E. Squires, The Mystery of the Quantum World (Bristol: Adam-Hilger, 1986), PP. 132-133.

5 . R. Feynman, The Feynman Lectures on Physics (Reading Mass.: Adison-Wesley Pub. Co. 1960), Vol. 3, P. 2-9.

6 . M. Born, The Born Einstein Letters, trans. by Irene Born (London: Macmillan, 1971), P. 91.

7 . Quoted in S. Jaki, God and the Cosmologists (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1988), PP. 152-153.

8. Microphysical Reality and Quantum Formalism, ed. by A. Vander Merwe., F. Selleri and G. Tarozzi (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), Vol. 1, P. ix.